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* Abstract
Traditionally explanations of police use of force have relied on a racial threat
perspective. Tests of this perspective, however, typically offer a single indicator
of threat (the relative size of the black population) and fail to adequately take
into account the complex relationship between racial threat and police use of
force. Drawing on racial threat, social disorganization, and police use of force
literature, this study hypothesizes that macro-level patterns in police use of force
are embedded in the racial and structural composition of cities and the organizational climate of local politics and police departments. The present study examines these relationships using official police use of force data collected in 73 large
U.S. cities. Structural equation analyses suggest that structural indicators associated with racial threat and social disorganization/disadvantage impact police use
of force indirectly through the influence of police organizational factors. On the
other hand, the political climate and the level of social disorganization in urban
areas have a direct bearing on the rates of police use of force. The implications of
these findings for research and theory on police use of force are discussed.

JUSTICE RESEARCH AND POLICY, Vol. 7, No. 1
© 2005 Justice Research and Statistics Association

54 • Justice Research and Policy

What factors determine the use of force by police? Structural explanations of
police use of coercive control traditionally have focused either on conventional
assumptions regarding community violence or racial threat explanations. The
conventional assumption suggests that police use force in reaction to the dangers
they encounter in communities (Fyfe, 1980; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). Racial
threat explanations, in contrast, suggest that coercive control of citizens by the
police is a political instrument used to suppress the potential threat lower classes
or minorities pose to the hegemony of the white elite (Chambliss & Seidman,
1980). Although previous research on police use of deadly force suggests that
the conventional assumption does play a role in explaining police-on-citizen
violence, sociological work has found more support for threat explanations
(see Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Holmes, 2000). To date, structural-level work on
police behavior has focused almost exclusively on political or racial threat explanations and ignored the broader array of structural characteristics and police
organizational properties that may account for aggregate explanations of police
use of force.
In the present study, we offer an integrated conceptual model of the most
common use of force by police—nonlethal force. We merge indicators of structural conditions with police organization-level data in order to identify the context in which police use of force varies. The conceptual model incorporates
dimensions of the racial threat perspective while also taking into account the
contextual (ecological) structure of cities and nature of police organizations in
one coherent theoretical framework. Specifically, we integrate racial threat and
urban disadvantage perspectives (Wilson, 1987; Massey, Gross, & Shibuya 1994;
Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls 1997) with literature on police organizations to
explain the rates of police use of force. We propose that differences in the aggregate rates of police-on-citizen force can be explained by examining the interconnections between the social, economic, and political characteristics of cities and
the style of policing. To begin, we briefly review previous macro-level research
on police use of force.

* Macro-Level Police Use of Force Research
Police use of force is a topic of great importance and debate among criminologists, which explains the considerable amount of research devoted to it in the
literature (see reviews by Geller & Toch, 1995; Adams, 1999; Barlow & Barlow,
2000). Specifically, studies of police use of force have examined how individual,
situational, community, and organization-level determinants explain its use
(Adams, 1999). Geller and Toch (1995) review the literature and pinpoint many
important factors that affect police use of force, particularly situational ones.
Since the 1960s, a general theme in much of the literature is that those who

Police Use of Force • 55

challenge the “authority” of the police are more likely than others to experience
police use of force (Reiss, 1971). Not surprisingly, research indicates that African-Americans are overrepresented among excessive force complaints filed against
law enforcement agencies (Pate & Fridell, 1993). Complaints filed by AfricanAmericans, however, are less likely to be sustained than complaints filed by Hispanic or white citizens.
Several studies have examined the link between race and policing at the neighborhood level of analysis. Many of these studies found significant neighborhood
differences on attitudes toward police and perceived policing style (Schuman &
Greenberg, 1972; Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Weitzer, 1999). Moreover, research
over the past four decades has overwhelmingly found that minorities, males,
juveniles, and citizens from lower socioeconomic status have more negative attitudes toward the police (for review, see Hurst & Frank, 2000).
Building on this literature, a handful of recent studies have found that suspect race and demeanor are strong determinants of an officer’s decision to use
force (see Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Reisig, McCluskey, Mastrofski, &
Terrill, 2004; Terrrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Worden, 1995). For example,
Mastofski, Reisig, and McCluskey (2002) found that suspects encountered by
the police in neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage had
a greater probability of displaying resistance toward the officer(s), and this lack
of deference was associated with an increased likelihood of the officer resorting
to force. Both Terrill and Reisig (2003) and Terrill (2003) found that officers
were more likely to use force in areas characterized by higher levels of disadvantage, regardless of whether or not the suspect offered any resistance or deference
to the officer during the police-suspect encounter. This research is consistent with
other studies that have found police are more likely to use force when the subjects reside in predominately black neighborhoods (Barlow & Barlow, 2000;
Georges-Abeyie, 1991; Smith, 1986; Worden, 1995). While these studies highlight the influence of structural factors on the perceived and actual behavior of
the police and police use of force, one notable limitation is that much of the
previous research uses a single site or area.
The majority of city-level studies on police use of force also focus on its most
infrequent but serious application—the use of deadly force (see e.g., Jacobs &
Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Unfortunately, many of these studies failed
to report basic descriptive information about the organizational characteristics
of law enforcement agencies across cities, which limits our knowledge of why
use of deadly force rates fluctuate so significantly between police departments
(Geller & Scott, 1992). As a result, few studies have been able to examine the
concomitant role of police organizational factors and community structural factors on police use of force.
Wilson’s early work on police organizations suggested that police work is
carried out under the influence of a political culture (Wilson, 1968) and that
police aggressiveness occurs more often in departments with legalistic styles
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(Wilson & Boland, 1978). The style and organizational structure of the police
department affects officer behavior, including using force (Alpert & MacDonald,
2001). Manning (1994) makes this point when he states, “American policing has
been and remains highly politicized, especially locally” (p.675).
The authority that police are empowered with by the state and the citizenry
lies in their restraint of the use of force (Bittner, 1990). However, this mandated
power is not independent of the prevailing political climate but a product of a
“negotiated, politically allocated function shared with other agencies” (Manning, 1994, p. 675). The issue becomes further complicated by the virtual absence of a widespread, unifying mandate regarding the acceptable applications
of police use of force (Manning, 1977). Police agencies rely on the local political
culture that governs a municipality. As a result, the city government is able to
exert its influence on the local police agency. The police are organizationally and
legally bound to apply sanctions within a politically defined region (Gibbs, 1966),
and this region and its accompanying political climate may change with the whims
of the time, changes in representation, or in response to police abuses of power.
Therefore, it is perceivable that a political climate that supports an aggressive
policing style can raise the potential for misapplication of police force.
The literature highlights the importance of taking into account the influence
of distinct organizational differences on police use of force within the context of
the socioeconomic and political environment of municipalities. One notable example is Klinger’s (1997) ecological community-level explanation, which he developed in response to what he considered a minimal amount of research about
“the possibility that police action might vary across urban neighborhoods”
(Klinger 1997, p. 278). This approach offers a multilevel perspective that integrates the macro-level features of police organizations and local communities
with the micro-level behaviors that characterize police-suspect encounters (Klinger,
2004). Klinger argued that police might exercise less vigor (i.e., exercise their
legal authority less) in districts where deviance levels are high (Klinger, 1997);
these districts also tend to be areas that are disproportionately minority and
black (Sampson & Wilson, 1995).
Other studies investigating multicity or community differences in police use
of force tend to rely on either the conflict or community violence perspectives
and ignore police organizational level factors. While predictors from both perspectives have empirical support (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Liska &Yu, 1992;
Sorensen, Marquart, & Brock, 1993), the research suggests more support for the
racial threat perspective (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Liska & Yu, 1992). The variable “percent minority,” for example, is interpreted as an indicator of racial
threat, and research finds that city police departments disproportionately use
deadly force against minorities (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). These results are therefore interpreted as indicators of the police using deadly force in an effort to
maintain official social control. To date, research has yet to examine the relationships between racial threat, socioeconomic and political structures of urban
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areas, the formal organizations of the police, and police use of force. The present
study fills this gap in the literature by offering a conceptual framework that
accounts for this complexity.1

* Theoretical Arguments
We argue that police use of force is embedded in the racial and structural composition of cities and the organizational climate of local politics and police departments. While individual and situational factors affect police-on-citizen violence (e.g., police crackdowns; see Sherman, 1990), the basic premise of this
study is that social and economic characteristics of cities and the relationship of
these characteristics with the local political climate and the police organization
explain the variation in aggregate rates of police use of force. First, we propose
to incorporate racial threat and social disorganization perspectives into the macrolevel study of police use of force. We argue that structural conditions associated
with racial threat and disorganization/urban disadvantage contribute to the breakdown in informal social control, resulting in higher rates of police use of force. 2
Secondly, we consider the indirect relationship between structural characteristics
and use of force via police organizations. That is, we argue the organizational
climate of police departments is likely influenced by contextual (ecological) characteristics of cities, impacting the sense of connection between residents and
the political system, and resulting in higher rates of police use of force. In an
effort to fully delineate this conceptual framework, we briefly review the racial
threat literature.
Racial threat theories suggest that as the relative size of the minority group
increases, members of the majority group perceive a growing threat to their po-

1

In addition to the threat perspective, we also acknowledge the relevance of the
conventional assumption or community violence explanation of police use of force. In the
initial set of analyses, we tested for the community violence perspective but found no
empirical support for the relationship between police rates of force and violent crime
rates. Given that the focus of this present study is nonlethal force it is not unreasonable to
find that these incidents are not a function of police responding to incidents of lethal
threat. After all, most incidents of nonlethal force used by the police are cases in which
citizens are noncompliant with officer orders (Adams, 1999).
2
The threat arguments assumes homogeneity within the black community when
dealing with the police while, in truth, much of the literature reveals a great deal of diversity (both positive and negative) in relations between black communities and the police
(Weitzer, 2000). While we agree that neighborhood differences in attitudes toward the
police may impact how the police and citizens perceive threats, the ability to measure the
existence of diversity in relationships between black communities and police is beyond the
conceptual scope of this study and our data.
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sitions and take steps to reduce the competition (Blalock, 1967). Blalock argues
that the response of the majority to the increase in minority size assumes two
forms: competition over economic resources and power threats. Recognizing that
these two forms of threat are difficult to disentangle, researchers have investigated two conceptually distinct threat-based hypotheses—political threat and
economic threat, in accordance with Blalock’s work. The political threat hypothesis postulates that as the relative size of the black population increases, the state
will increasingly perceive blacks as a threat to whites’ political power and intensify social control to maintain the dominant position of whites. On the other
hand, the economic threat hypothesis asserts that as blacks compete for jobs,
positions, and economic resources, they increasingly become a threat to the economic well-being of whites. As a result, social control efforts can be used to
exclude blacks from participating in the economic sphere and thus lessen the
economic competition between the racial groups.
Studies have linked racial threat (via the relative size of the black population) to police use of deadly force (Chamlin, 1989), the death penalty (Phillips,
1986; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002), interracial killings (Jacobs & Wood, 1999),
other types of social control over blacks outside of the criminal justice system,
such as lynching (Corzine, Creech, & Huff-Corzine, 1983; Corzine, Huff-Corzine,
& Creech,1988; Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989), as well as fear of crime (Quillian
& Pager, 2001). Moreover, researchers have found that the size of the minority
population is directly related to heightened use of official social control (see Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Brown & Warner, 1992; Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg,
2002). While the research documents the influential effect of minority presence
on social control, we consider the following important considerations.
First, recent studies acknowledge that one of the most significant limitations in
the racial threat literature is the dependency on the relative size of the black population as the sole measure of racial threat (see Eitle et al., 2002; Stolzenberg, D’Alessio,
& Eitle, 2004; Liska, 1987). While there is support for the positive impact of black
percentage on police size, expenditures, use of deadly force, and total arrest rate
(Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson,
1981), these studies have used one measure of racial threat—black composition. In
this study we incorporate two indicators of racial threat—black composition (the
relative size of the black population) and racial inequality. Racial inequality has
been offered as a valid indicator of racial economic threat in previous studies (Eitle
et al., 2002; Olzak, 1990; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Stolzenberg et al., 2004).
Second, although Blalock (1967) specifically discusses the distinct impact of
the perceived economic and political threat posed by minority groups, few studies include both political and economic measures in their empirical work (see
Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Eitle et al., 2002). By incorporating indicators of
police organizational climate and the political mobilization of blacks in city government, we are able to account for potential rival factors as we estimate the
relationship between racial threat and police use of force at the macro-level. In
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addition, including multiple indicators in our study and testing for simultaneous
equations allows us to estimate the potential for both direct and indirect linkages
between racial threat indicators, the political climate, and use of police force.
Finally, we take into account the level of social disorganization/urban disadvantage in urban areas in our theoretical model. That is, we advance the
literature by testing for potential linkages between urban disadvantage and the
use of social control (police use of force) in a way that is consistent with racial
threat and race-relations arguments. Scholars have found evidence of high levels
of racial residential segregation and concentrated economic disadvantage in urban areas (Massey & Eggers, 1990; Alba, Logan, & Stults, 2000). We argue
that segregation and concentrated disadvantage in urban areas may increase
anti-black affect and racial threat, subsequently leading to higher rates of police
use of force.

* Conceptual Model
As stated, our conceptual model takes into account both racial threat and social
disorganization/disadvantage perspectives in a macro-level examination of police use of force across multiple urban cities. Figure 1 delineates some of the
direct and indirect linkages between racial threat, disorganization/disadvantage
and social control.

* Figure 1
Conceptual Model of Police Use of Force
▲

Political Climate
Police Organization

▲

▲

Racial Threat
Social Disorganization

Police
Use of Force
▲

To begin, we argue that racial threat is directly related to police use of force. The
racial threat perspective suggests that as the size of the minority population increases, the need for the police to use force and protect the interests of the dominant groups becomes greater (Chambliss & Seidman, 1980). We test this claim
by hypothesizing that:
H1: As the size of the black population increases, police use of
force also increases.
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The second indicator of racial threat, racial inequality, incorporates ratio measures of the degree of racial disparities in unemployment, income levels, and
educational attainment in urban cities in an effort to capture economic rivalries
between blacks and whites. The ratio of white to black unemployment has been
offered as a valid indicator of racial threat in previous research (Olzak, 1990;
Jacobs & Wood, 1999). Because large scores on ratio indicators indicate less
racial economic threat, and thus less perceived threat, racial inequality should be
inversely related to police use of force. We hypothesize that:
H2: As racial inequality increases, police use of force decreases.
Turning to the hypothesized relationship between disorganization/urban disadvantage (racial residential segregation, economic deprivation, residential mobility)
and police use of force, we expect that indicators consistent with social disorganization/disadvantage will influence the community’s abilities to control various types
of antisocial behavior (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Wilson, 1987). Low economic status, higher levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and a high degree of residential
mobility affect a community’s level of social disorganization (Crutchfield, Geerken,
& Gove, 1982; Kornhauser, 1978; Bursik, 1988). Sampson and Groves (1989) argue that, “low-socioeconomic-status communities will suffer from a weaker organizational base than higher-status communities” (1989, 780). Therefore, these communities have less ability to engage in the necessary informal social control to
inhibit crime and deviance. Poverty and racial isolation are also key conditions
leading to an increasingly disengaged social environment—deterioration of housing, schools, family disruption, recreational facilities, and other community organizations (Wacquant & Wilson, 1989). Researchers have documented that these
structural disadvantages are stratified across racial and ethnic lines (Massey &
Denton, 1993; Massey et al., 1994). In the urban city, blacks have become largely
socially isolated from whites and suffer greater levels of disadvantage within these
environments (Massey & Eggers, 1990; Sampson & Wilson, 1995).
When incorporating these arguments, it becomes evident that cities with higher
levels of social disorganization and disadvantage are less able to regulate the
behavior of their residents. Residents of low-income minority communities are
also more likely to be disconnected from the political establishment. Research by
Cohen and Dawson (1993), for example, indicates that in areas with high concentrations of poor minorities, residents are less connected to political institutions and more distrustful of the political system in general than residents of
“middle class” areas. In cities with high levels of minority concentration and
structural inequality, therefore, there should be a higher prevalence of police use
of force because police and community relations are particularly strained and the
police represent the main instruments of social control (Weitzer, 1999). Given
this, our theoretical expectation is that:
H3: As social disorganization/disadvantage increases, police use
of force also increases.
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Considering the potential for indirect effects is also central to this research—
in particular, that the level of police organization mediates the influence of racial
threat and social disorganization/disadvantage on police use of force. City governments directly affect the type and style of police work that is conducted (Klinger
1997; Manning 1994). As Wilson (1968) notes, “police work is carried out under the influence of a political culture” (p. 233). As a result, the prevailing political culture of a city impacts the organizational structure of the police. Police and
community relations are affected by the organizational structure of the police
department (Manning 1994; Wilson, 1968). If the political establishment (the
mayor and city council) of a city permits police departments to adopt certain
styles of policing (e.g., aggressive, zero tolerance, etc.) that give the police a strong
degree of autonomy, it is likely that police use of force against citizens will be
more common. Therefore, we suggest that the effects of racial threat and urban
disadvantages on police use of force are mediated by the political climate and
style of policing adopted in cities.
To test this proposition, we examine the influence of political factors (via the
race of the city mayor and the organization of the police) on the rates of police
force used against citizens. Prior literature suggests that the presence of a black
mayor in a city may help alleviate some of the tensions between the political
system and the residents, since disadvantaged minority residents may feel a greater
sense of connection with the political establishment if a minority political leader
is in control of the city government (Saltzstein, 1989). Research indicates that
cities with black mayors have more active black political participation and greater
levels of trust in local government (Abney & Hutcheson, 1981; Bobo & Gilliam,
1990). The presence of a black mayor is associated with a higher black representation among police officers and adoption of citizen controls (Saltzstein, 1989).
Evidence also indicates that a black mayor is associated with fewer police killings of black civilians (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Accordingly, we expect that the
presence of black mayors would reduce incidents of police use of force through
the creation of a greater sense of trust in the political establishment and police
policies that were more responsive to citizen concerns.
H4: The presence of a black city mayor reduces police use of force.
Furthermore, when taking into account the role of police organizations, we
expect that certain aspects of police organizations will influence the rate of use of
force and, more specifically, that these organizational factors will mediate the
influence of structural characteristics on use of force rates. Police unions are
organized to look out for the interests of their members and provide protection
from scrutiny. As collective bargaining units, police unions should have a strong
impact on police operations and management decisions (Reiss, 1992). With regard to police use of force, police unions are formally interested in defending
officers who are accused of using excessive force and protecting the liability
of the police officer (Kelling & Kliesmet, 1995). Police unions may, therefore,
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provide a greater degree of autonomy to the police officer and as a result increase
the likelihood that officers will use force against citizens, since the officer will
know he or she has greater job security. This literature would lead us to expect
that police unions will increase the rates of force in cities, particularly urban
cities with high levels of structural inequality and racial threat.
On the other hand, law enforcement accreditation is also an important modern day aspect of law enforcement organizations. Accreditation is premised on
the notion that professionally developed departmental-level policies and procedures can improve police behavior. Proponents of accreditation suggest that accreditation improves the professionalism and responsibility of police agencies
(Fyfe, 1998). Accordingly, this literature would lead us to believe accreditation
may reduce police use of force, since police will conduct their work in a more
professional manner. However, we must also recognize that accreditation may be
impeded by the presence of widespread disadvantage and disorganization in urban areas. Thus, our final set of hypotheses state that:
H5a: Police unions will mediate the effects of racial threat and
social disorganization on police use of force.
H5b: Police departmental accreditation will mediate the effects of
racial threat and social disorganization on police use of force rates.

* Data and Methods
We tested our theoretical perspective by analyzing the influence of city-level structural indicators on departmental use of force data. The unit of analysis is the city,
which is consistent with other literature that has examined the effect of structural determinants of police use of force (see Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Despite
the fact that there are important intra-city structural variations, we believe this
unit of analysis is appropriate because police departments operate under citylevel political administrations (Sampson & Cohen, 1988). The data for police
use of force are based on responses to a national survey of law enforcement
agencies conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).
The PERF study was originally designed to determine police agencies’ reporting systems, policy guidelines, and prevalence and litigation relating to the
use of force (Alpert &Kenney, 1997). Thus, it was one of the first attempts to
create a national database on police use of force incidents. The original study
used a random sample drawn from a national mailing list compiled by the International City Manager’s Association that contained 40% of the large municipal
and county police agencies (N = 320) and 60% of the small agencies (N = 480).
However, the survey results revealed that a significant amount of police agencies
do not require formal reports in many instances when various forms of force are
employed, and also that the number of incidents, rates of force, and complaints
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of force varied substantially among agencies (see discussion of limitations by
Pate & Fridell, 1993). Due to these limitations, the current study limits its sample
to only those departments that provided complete police use of force reports for
the calendar year 1996.
In an attempt to control for this departmental variation, the current sample
is also limited to only those departments with a population of 100,000 or more
to minimize the differences across reporting jurisdictions and increase the comparability of structural characteristics. The municipal and larger police agencies
were found to be more likely to routinely collect complete data on the use of
force incidents, which indeed may be related to their frequency of occurrence
within these departments (Alpert & Kenney, 1997). The final sample is 73 American cities with a population of 100,000 whose police departments were surveyed.3
In addition to the PERF survey, we also utilized the 1990 Bureau of Census
population statistics (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1994) and data from the International City Managers Association.
Dependent Variable
Since we hypothesize that structural conditions will explain police use of
force, we analyze the rate of police use of force incidents. This measure is calculated by dividing the number of incidents of force (in agencies that report all uses
of nonlethal force) by the resident population of the agency and standardized by
100,000.4 Use of force was defined by reporting agencies as any nonlethal force
(excluding handcuffing a suspect) in which an officer or his or her supervisor
was required to fill out a use of force report. We recognize that using official data
on police use of force has its limitations since the data cannot be validated with
any other data source. Because of skewness in the distribution of the dependent
variable, this measure was converted to natural logarithmic form in the multivariate regression model.

3
Because over half of the responding agencies did not collect use of force data, there
is an inherent sample selection bias in the present study. Departments that do not require
the collection of use of force forms, for example, may have more severe use of force
problems than those that do. There were no significant differences in population or basic
demographic variables (city size, geographic region, percent black) between the missing
and non-missing cities. The agencies that collected these data and provided them to PERF
represent a broad geographic sample of agencies from across the nation. Unfortunately,
there is no national clearinghouse of use of force data. Despite the limits of the sample
used, we think that the importance of this issue warrants the use of these data for the
present study.
4
The data collected by PERF, unfortunately, did not ask police departments to disaggregate their use of force reports by race. As a result, we are not able to provide a direct
test of racial threat perspectives on the likelihood that police will use force against minority groups (see Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998).
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Independent and Control Variables
The concepts comprising our theoretical model are macro-level indicators
that reflect the social and economic characteristics of urban cities. The indicators
of our model include black composition, urban disadvantage (segregation and
economic deprivation), racial inequality, residential mobility, political climate,
and police organization. We employ these measures because of their theoretical
relevance to structural explanations of violence in general, and police-on-citizen
violence in particular (Liska & Yu, 1992).
To measure the presence of racial threat, we compute “black composition”
by dividing the number of black persons by the total population. The racial threat
hypothesis suggests that a greater presence of minorities threatens whites (Blalock,
1967) and, as indicated earlier, the relative size of the black population is the
most commonly used measure of racial threat in the literature (see Stolzenberg et
al., 2004). Our second measure of racial threat, racial inequality, is based on
three ratio indicators: the ratio of white to black median family income; the ratio
of white to black median years of schooling attained by persons 25 years old and
over; and the ratio of black unemployment rates to white unemployment rates
(see Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Messner & Golden, 1992;
Parker & McCall, 1999). Using a principal components factor analysis, these
measures were combined into a single “racial inequality” index. All three indicators loaded on the same factor at the 0.60 level or above.
In accord with social disorganization and urban disadvantage perspectives
(Sampson & Groves, 1989; Wilson, 1987), several measures are employed: racial
residential segregation, economic deprivation, and residential mobility. First, residential segregation is measured by the index of dissimilarity that reflects the unevenness in the distribution of two racial groups across census tracts within a city
(Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Massey & Denton, 1993; Messner & Golden, 1992; Parker
& McCall, 1999; Peterson & Krivo, 1993). Second, economic deprivation is an
index that includes the percentage of persons living below the poverty line, the
percentage of unemployed persons, and the percentage of children under age 18 not
living with both parents. Using factor analysis, these two measures (racial residential segregation and economic deprivation) were combined in an overall composite
measure of “urban disadvantage.” All measures loaded on the same factor above
0.60. Third, residential mobility was operationalized as 1 minus the proportion of
residents who reported they lived in the same residence for the previous five years.
In addition to measures of threat and social disorganization, we incorporate
measures of the political climate and the style of police organization in large
cities. First, we measure the political climate by the race of the mayor. We use a
dummy variable indicating whether the city mayor is black. Second, we include
two measures of police organization that have theoretical bearing on police
behavior. Two separate dummy variable measures of police organization are
included: whether a department has union representation and whether a department is nationally accredited. Finally, we include two control measures—
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population size and south. Population size is the size of the resident city population and south is a dummy code where 1 indicates the city is located in the southern region of the United States. The population size measure was converted to
natural logarithmic form to reduce the effects of outliers and increase the likelihood of bivariate normality (Fox, 1991).

* Results
Sample Description
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables. The data
indicate that on average there were 97 use of force incidents per 100,000 city
residents. The official reported per capita force in these data is higher than that
reported in a national self-reported study of police use of force (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 1997) because this official measure contains only large urban cities
and can include multiple incidents of force used against the same citizen in a year.
Fifteen percent of the cities in our sample had a black mayor. Fifty-three percent
of the police departments were nationally accredited and 60% had a police union.

* Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable

Police Use of Force Rate (log)
Black Composition
Racial Inequality Index
Urban Disadvantage Index
Residential Mobility
Political Power (Black Mayor)
Police Accreditation
Union Presence
South
Population Size

Mean

97.07 (3.96)
20.92
4.55
32.77
57.03
.15
.53
.60
.45
304,394.52

SD

121.05 (1.28)
16.60
.95
11.10
6.42
.36
.50
.49
.50
441,484.13

Model Estimation
We follow other social ecological literature (Rosenfeld, Mesner, & Baumer,
2001) and estimate structural equation models (SEM) of the relationships between racial threat, social disorganization/disadvantage, and police use of force,
controlling for the mediating influence of the police organization. Specifically,
we employ the use of SEM so that we can test the conceptual model and simulta-

66 • Justice Research and Policy

neously estimate the direct and indirect effects of racial threat and structural
indicators of social disorganization on police use of force when accounting for
potential mediating influences of political climate and police organizational factors. This recursive model is estimated using the AMOS 4 software program.
Findings
Table 2 presents the results of the simultaneous maximum likelihood regression model of racial threat and social disorganization measures on political
climate, police organizational factors, and police use of force. The chi-square
test and other statistical tests of model fit, which indicate a good fit of the data
to the model, are also reported in Table 2.5 For a visual display of the relationships, a path diagram is provided in Figure 2, with only the statistically significant results shown.
The model directly addresses the question of whether variations in police use
of force are attributed to variations in structural predictors of racial threat and
social disorganization. First, we find that our indicators of racial threat do not
have a direct impact on police use of force rates. An increase in the relative size of
the black population does not directly influence police use of force rates, as predicted with hypothesis 1. Additionally, we expected that higher levels of racial
inequality would have an inverse impact on police use of force (hypothesis 2),
which was also not supported in this study. Our results do provide some support
for the direct influence of social disorganization on use of police force. We find
that residential mobility is positively associated with police use of force rates.
These results, therefore, provide partial support for the third hypothesis in indicating the direct effect of one structural antecedent of social disorganization on
police use of force. In contrast, the urban disadvantage index does not have a
statistically significant, direct impact on use of force rates. Overall, we find no
support for racial threat and limited support for social disorganization/disadvantage indicators on police force rates when estimating direct effects. These
findings would call into question the utilization of these theories when understanding aggregated police (rather than criminal) behavior in urban cities if only
direct effects were considered. However, building on an extant literature that
documents the importance of political climate and police organizational factors
to police use of force (see, for example, Klinger 1997; Manning 1994), we further hypothesize that these indicators will mediate the link between structural
characteristics and police use of force rates. We now turn to the results concerning these more complex relationships.

5

All variance inflation factors for these independent variables are well below the
value of 4.0 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989), indicating that multicollinearity is not
a problem with these models.
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We find solid evidence that police organizational characteristics mediate the
relationships between racial threat, disorganization/disadvantage, and police use of
force rates. In terms of racial threat indicators, the black composition in a city
(racial threat) is negatively associated with the presence of police unions (B = -.026),
which translates into higher rates of police force (B = 75.466). These findings
support our hypothesis that unions would increase police use of force through
their impact on police culture and protecting individual officer discretion and
autonomy. On the other hand, none of the indirect linkages involving racial inequality, police organizations, and use of force were significant in the model.

* Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Unstandardized Regression Estimates (and Standard
Errors) for the Simultaneous Equation Model of Threat, Structural Conditions,
)
Police
Organization and Police Use of Force (N = 73).

Variable

Accred.

Police Organization
Union
Political Power

Police
Use of Force

Racial Threat Indicators
Black
Composition

-.016)
(.011)

-.026)***
(.005)

.004)
(.004)

.817)
(1.490)

Racial Inequality

-.133)
(.133)

.055)
(.061)

.030)
(.049)

21.515)
(15.526)

Disorganization/Disadvantage Indicators
Residential Mobility

-.036)**
(.016)

-.007)
(.007)

.008)
(.006)

5.910)***
(1.965)

Urban Disadvantage

.024)*
(.015)

.033)***
(.007)

.008)
(.005)

.970)
(2.072)

Police Organization and Political Climate Indicators
Police Accreditation

——

——

——

-24.530)**
(14.201)

Union Presence

——

——

——

74.701)***
(31.067)

Political Power
(Black Mayor)

——

——

——

75.466)**
(36.997)

Population Size

——

——

——

-24.735)
(18.554)

Model X2 = 15.390, p = .165, TLI = .988, CFI = .997, RMSEA = .074
* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01;

–––– denotes relationship not estimated.

▲

* p < .10

** p < .05

▲

*** p < .01

Control Measure: Population Size

Political Power/
Black Mayor

Unions

75.466** (.217)

74.70** (.289)

-24.53** (-.184)

▲

Black Composition

**

)

71

▲

(-.8

** (.
713)

▲

*
26
-.0

.033*

Police Accreditation

▲

Racial Inequality Index

(-.242)

271)
.024* (.

-.036**

5.910*** (.298)

POLICE ORGANIZATION

▲

Urban Disadvantage Index

Residential Mobility

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS
▲

3.488*** (.224)

FORCE

OF

USE

POLICE

* Figure 2
Structural Equation Model of the Relationship between Threat, Structural Conditions, Police Organization and Police Use of
Force (N = 73) (Standardized Coefficients in Parentheses)
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While these findings are inconsistent with other literature on police use of deadly
force (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998) and indicate that the more frequently used nonlethal force is not directly or indirectly affected by economic divisions between
blacks and whites (i.e., racial inequality), the null effect of this indicator on the
use of social control is consistent with recent studies (Eitle et al., 2002; Stolzenberg
et al., 2004). Overall, some support is found for our hypothesis concerning the
indirect effect of racial threat on police use of force when mediated by police
organizations. Importantly, police unions are more relevant to the racial threat
indicators than accreditation.
Compared to racial threat, stronger support is found for the influence of
social disorganization/disadvantage indicators on police use of force when police organizations are accounted for. Residential mobility is significantly associated with police department accreditation (B = -.036), which reduces the rates
of police use of force (B = -24.53). The model also indicates that national accreditation has a significant negative effect on police use of force rates, holding
other variables constant. We find also that higher levels of urban disadvantage
have a positive impact on the presence of police unions (B = .033), which translates into higher rates of police use of force (B = 74.70). On the other hand,
while the level of urban disadvantage also increases the likelihood of police
accreditation (B = .024), police use of force is significantly reduced in urban
cities as a result (B = -24.53). Thus, consistent with our predictions, the level of
police organization appears to mediate the effects of racial threat (black composition) and social disorganization (residential mobility, urban disadvantage index) on police use of force rates.
The level of racial threat and social disorganization/disadvantage is not related to whether the mayor of the city is black (political power). Rather, political
power among black mayors has a direct, positive effect on police use of force. We
proposed that the presence of black mayors would reduce incidents of police use
of force through reducing racial tensions and creating a greater sense of trust in
the political establishment, as well as contributing to police policies that were
more responsive to citizen concerns. The results, on the other hand, may indicate
that the presence of a black mayor in cities may increase tensions between the
police and the community because the police may feel that the city administrator
does not support its policies for maintaining coercive social control. A good example of the tension between a black mayor and the police department is the city
of Los Angeles, where Mayor Tom Bradley was consistently at odds with the
police department, but was unable to effectively curb the aggressive style of policing minorities that the police had been engaging in for years.
The findings from the model support our claims that relationships between
racial threat and police use of force are more complex than those previously
examined in the literature. Aggregate rates of police use of force do not appear
to be directly affected by racial threat; rather, one must also take into account
the level of structural disadvantage, police organization, and the political
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climate of cities. The results indicate that police use of force is greatest in cities
with the greatest amount of residential mobility and where police unions and
black mayors are present. These findings also suggest that police use of force is
embedded within the structural, police organizational, and political dynamics
of a city. In other words, police use of force can be explained on an aggregate
level by structural factors related to the urban ecology, police organization, and
political climates of cities. The influence of racial threat on police use of force is
mediated by police organizations (specifically, the presence of police unions).
Our findings indicate that the presence of police unions has a positive impact on police use of force rates. Although literature directly addressing the
structure, function, and role of police unions has been virtually nonexistent
since the work of Juris and Feuille (1974), a relatively recent survey conducted
by Kelling and Kliesmet (1995) of 18 police unions provides some insight
into the views and positions of police unions across states toward police use of
force.6 The unions ranged in size from 21 to 2,500 members. Twelve of the
unions were designated as bargaining units and the remaining 6 were from states
that did not formally recognize police unions (i.e., also including what are commonly referred to as “right-to-work” states). Twelve of the 18 police unions felt
that they had no role in determining use of force policy development; all but
one, however, sensed they should at least have some role. The overwhelming
consensus among the unions was that use of force guidelines and policies are
necessary and important, but that they should only result in the union’s involvement once a complaint is handed down. However, it is obviously in the best
interest of the union for its officers to follow the correct procedures regarding
use of force in order to save the union from the high costs of legal representation
and defense.
Drawing from this research, it is likely that the police departments in the
cities that have union representation will have higher rates of force because the
unions ensure legal representation to their members without providing much
oversight or input into how they (the police) are to exercise their discretion.
However, one cautionary note is in order. There may be an inherent bias in this
study’s sample toward those cities with less union representation having higher
use of force rates because the frequency of use of force tends to be higher in
larger agencies (Alpert & Kenney, 1997).
Findings from this study suggest the importance of national accreditation in
reducing the rates of force in urban cities. These findings are consistent with
research that suggests organizational factors are important determinants of
police officer behavior (Wilson, 1968; Smith, 1986). In this context, it appears

6

As of the early 1990s, nearly 75% of all police officers in the United States held
active union memberships (Walker, 1992).
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that nationally accredited agencies may have fewer problems with the misuse of
force because their hiring and training requirements produce more professional
police officers who use verbal tactics or other methods that avoid the use of
force against citizens. Accreditation has its origins in 1979 with an effort to
develop a minimal set of national standards for policing. As of 1995, as many as
368 agencies had been accredited and several hundred more were in pursuit of
accreditation (Dantzker, 1997). Some large agencies have opted not to become
accredited, however, because of the lengthy accreditation process (which usually takes three years) and because of the cost.7

* Discussion and Conclusion
The findings from this study provide a preliminary basis for understanding the
macro-level relationships between police and urban residents in American cities
that account for aggregate patterns in police officers’ use of force. The results
lend support to social ecological explanations of aggregate patterns of police use
of force. Both the racial threat and social disorganization/disadvantage perspective were found to be significant predictors on police use of force. Specifically,
the economic changes in cities that increase the out-migration of residents from
large cities (Wilson, 1987) create the conditions under which police are more
likely to use coercive social control against civilians. It is not unreasonable to
suggest that the manifestations of police use of force are strained community
relations whereby the police are viewed as an occupying army. These findings
appear to be partially consistent with earlier research indicating that police are
significantly more likely to use or threaten to use force in predominantly poor
neighborhoods (Smith, 1986).
Official measures of police-on-citizen force, however, cannot be explained
solely in terms of economic deprivation. Rather, there appear to be deeper issues
related to structural disadvantages and the strained relationship that these environmental factors produce with the police that explains the frequency of force
used by the police. The empirical evidence from this research does not suggest
that police use of force is completely contingent on social ecological factors.
From these data it appears that the police organizational factors also influence
the likelihood of police use of force. Police departments that are nationally accredited have significantly lower rates of force. These findings suggest that municipal governments can influence the behavior of their police by requiring standards in hiring and training that cultivate a more professional police force.

7
Accreditation is estimated to cost about $16,000 for a department of 1,000 members
and an additional $16,000 every three years for reaccreditation (Bartollas & Hahn, 1999).
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There are several substantial limitations to the data used in this study that
prevent one from asserting a clear theoretical understanding of police use of
force. First, these data are limited by the fact that they represent only official
measures of police use of force. As a result, many departments in our sample may
underreport the actual incidence of force used against citizens. Second, these
data do not allow us to disaggregate force according to the race of the officer and
suspect. Therefore, we cannot ascertain the extent to which force is actually applied to lower-class minorities as our conceptual model implies. The literature on
police use of force, however, would imply that a disproportionate share of these
use of force reports do involve poor minority suspects. Third, the official indicators of the race of the city mayor, the presence of police unions, and law enforcement accreditation do not actually measure the political culture of the city governments or police departments. Instead, these factors represent proxy indicators
that are presumed to have theoretical bearing on the political culture of the city
and police organization.
Despite the limitations of the official data used in the present study, the results suggest that one cannot focus solely on issues of racial threat in explaining
macro-level patterns of police use of force. Conflict may be inevitable in the
authority-based relationships (Turk, 1969) that exist in racially segregated cities
where a chasm of misunderstanding and social distance exists between the city
government and residents. The findings from this study do provide some hope
for curtailing the rate of conflict between the police and citizens through focusing on changing the culture of the police organization.
In terms of social policy, it is important for social scientists to keep in mind
that political institutions can play a key role in developing trust (Levi & Stoker,
2000). This is especially important in racially stratified cities where residents
often have lost a sense of mutual obligation and trust, informal social controls
have been decimated, and the government is all that is left to maintain social
stability. The police as frontline bureaucrats are key players in the maintenance
of political connection with citizens in disenfranchised communities. Controlling
the rate of force used against citizens is an important component for establishing
trust between the community and the government. Research evidence suggests
that the more trusting citizens are of government, the less likely they are to violate laws (Tyler, 1990). Minimizing police use of force is, therefore, important
for maintaining the legitimacy of government and social control.
Future research should attempt to collect more comprehensive use of force
data at a national level that details the race of the officer and citizen as well as the
type of training on policies for each police agency. These data also could be
linked to public opinion data on the sense of connection to the police and political establishment. The improved data would allow the test of a more comprehensive model of police use of force, in which the impact of minority status could
be explicitly delineated within the context of structural characteristics of the
community and police department.
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